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ABSTRACT-In this article we compare the Canadian Heritage 
Rivers System with the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and analyze case 
law in order to identify the best means of ensuring preservation of Great 
Plains rivers. We find that fear of federal dictates provides a powerful 
political weapon for opponents of river preservation policies. Therefore, 
we conclude that national officials should work with state, provincial, 
and local officials to develop cooperative plans that enable local resi-
dents to participate in river management decisions. Cooperative river 
management policies avoid the perception of federal government action 
as threatening to state sovereignty, thereby removing a significant rhe-
torical and political obstacle to water preservation. 
KEY WORDS: Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Canadian Heritage Rivers Sys-
tem, environmental policy, river management, federalism 
Introduction 
Nature and culture on the Great Plains are both significant and signifi-
cantly understudied. Worster (1992: 105) wrote, "The ecological history of 
the Great Plains is still to be accomplished, still to find its historians. When 
they come to write it, they will have a subject of international significance, 
for these days the dry lands of the earth are under pressure and scrutiny." 
The ecology of the region serves as its common denominator. After all, the 
diversity of a region that crosses a national boundary and numerous state 
and provincial boundaries makes a unifying political culture unlikely. Rather 
than straining to identify a thread of shared political culture, it makes sense 
to focus on the common issues or problems within the region and the 
particular laws and policies enacted to address them. One such common 
issue is the management and preservation of water. 
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Water and its scarcity are vital concerns in all the Plains states and 
provinces. Thus, we need to understand the roles that governments play in 
protecting this critical and natural resource. Despite common concern, 
water policy varies across regimes of the North American Plains. Compari-
son across regimes may help us to identify better policies, better understand 
the problem-solving mechanisms of the various governments, and better 
appreciate the growing interdependence of political entities and institutions 
(Heidenheimer et al. 1983). Our approach is to compare the policies devel-
oped to manage rivers on the Great Plains. 
The provinces and states of the Great Plains have developed their own 
river policies, but both the Canadian and US governments have developed 
river management plans as well. However, federal or national guidance has 
been greeted with suspicion and resistance by many Plains residents 
(Miewald 1984; Carroll and Hendrix 1992; La Pierre 1994). Canada main-
tains' an unsteady balance between national unity and provincial identity 
(Thorn burn 1985; Pinard 1992; Gaudreault-DesBiens 1999). In the United 
States, antifederalists destroy federal buildings in protest of national gover-
nance (Apple 1995). Given the ambivalence and even hostility of Plains 
residents to federal control, national government mandates concerning wa-
ter resources tend to create resistance. 
Despite such difficulties, national water management programs may 
provide the greatest possibilities for preservation. The common water ethic 
on the Plains appears to be take as much as you can get (Reisner 1993). 
Links to environmental concerns in state or provincial policies have been 
modest at best (Fairfax et al. 1984). However, environmental protection is 
prioritized in the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (P.L. 90-542, 1968) and the 
Canadian Heritage Rivers System (Canadian Heritage Rivers System Ob-
jectives. Principles. and Procedures 1984). Despite their different ap-
proaches, both programs seek to limit agricultural and industrial use of 
water resources in order to preserve ecological, aesthetic, and recreational 
uses of water. 
Historically, water policies were the responsibility of state and provin-
cial governments (Fairfax et al. 1984; Elgie 2001). Residents were slow to 
recognized the ecological, aesthetic, or recreational values of water, per-
haps because their initial concerns focused on survival-from drought, 
blizzards, floods, grasshoppers, and other exigencies of the natural world 
(Miewald and Longo 1993). As David Aiken (2002:56) has pointed out, in 
the Great Plains, "water disputes typically focused on disputes among indi-
vidual appropriators"-consumers rather than preservers of the existing 
water supplies. In these disputes, the rule of priority has dominated (Aiken 
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2002:54). Preservationist measures were initiated at the national level in 
both Canada and the United States (Green 1999; Elgie 2001). Here we 
compare the effectiveness of those measures. 
Methods 
We use a comparative case method, which is appropriate because our 
interest is in explaining why antifederalist sentiment has been a greater 
obstacle to designation of rivers under the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
than under the Canadian Heritage Rivers System (Yin 1989). Both countries 
are federal systems in which water policy has historically rested with the 
state or provincial governments. In both countries, the national government 
has initiated river management efforts that emphasize preservation over the 
"beneficial use" that characterized state and provincial policies (Reisner 
1993). Yet public reactions to the two programs have differed. To explain 
these reactions, we examine the programmatic language of both the US Wild 
and Scenic Rivers Act and the Canadian Heritage Rivers System. We com-
pare the methods of river protection enacted, evaluate reactions to these 
measures within the affected states and provinces, consider the effects of 
case law on river preservation in Great Plains states, and draw inferences 
about the future of river preservation on the Plains from a comparison of 
Canadian and US river preservation policies. 
Results 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
By crafting river policies that prioritize use, the Plains states left the 
door open for federal intervention to protect habitat and aesthetic beauty of 
Plains rivers. In 1968 Congress enacted the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (P.L. 
90-542, 1968). The act led to the development of a system of wild and scenic 
rivers, each designated by an act of Congress and managed by the National 
Park Service. By assigning management responsibility to the National Park 
Service, Congress signaled its goal as preservation. As Sax (1980:709) 
described them, national parks in the United States are "enclaves of preser-
vation adrift in a sea of development." The act declared a different set of 
values for river policy than had been the practice of the state governments: 
The policy of the United States [is] that certain rivers of the nation, 
which with their immediate environments possess outstandingly 
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remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, his-
toric, cultural, or other similar values, shall be preserved in free-
flowing condition, and that they and their immediate environments 
shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of future genera-
tions. (Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, P.L. 90-542, 1968) 
The act gives Congress the authority to manage Plains rivers in a manner 
contrary to the "beneficial use" principle that typified state management 
(Reisner 1993). The shift in values for water policy was complicated by 
residents' suspicion of federal dictates. Local practice and preferences did 
not match congressional intentions, and the populist character of Plains 
residents led them to favor local control and resent federal intrusion (Foster 
1991). Clashes between local residents and federal policymakers were the 
foreseeable result. 
In North Dakota, a coalition of environmental organizations devel-
oped a plan to achieve federal wilderness designation for approximately 
200,000 acres of grasslands in the Badlands region and wild and scenic river 
designations for sections of the Little Missouri and Pembina Rivers (Agri-
cultural Law/Economic Research Program 1994). The proposal came under 
fire from local economic interests. Opposition to federal intervention united 
ranchers and oil producers with local citizens leery of outside influence in 
general and the federal government in particular (La Pierre 1994). The 
environmentalists who drafted the plan were characterized as outsiders 
threatening the livelihoods of local residents. 
In Texas, plans to designate a stretch of the Rio Grande downstream 
from Big Bend National Park as wild and scenic met with hostility from 
local residents. In public meetings, National Park Service personnel were 
met by irate citizens, who objected to a perceived "dictatorial tone" from the 
federal agency (Carroll and Hendrix 1992:350). Opposition to the project 
essentially derailed it as the National Park Service curtailed operational 
funding and transferred staff. 
In Minnesota, plans by the Department of Transportation to build a 
four-lane bridge over the St. Croix River were stopped by a National Park 
Service ruling. The National Park Service concluded the bridge "would 
have a direct and adverse effect on the scenic and recreational values of the 
Lower St. Croix National Scenic Riverway" (Heinrich 1997:18). The Min-
nesota Department of Transportation challenged the National Park Service's 
legal authority to block the bridge plan, arguing that regional transportation 
needs should take priority over the river's scenic value and its provision of 
habitat. The Minnesota Department of Transportation's motion for sum-
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mary judgment to vacate the National Park Service ruling was denied (Si-
erra Club North Star Chapter v. Pena, 1 F. Supp. 2d 971, 1998). 
Such problems can be understood as a consequence of the perception 
among Plains residents that the federal government's river management 
plans usurped authority over what should be a local matter. 
Canadian Heritage Rivers System 
In Canada, the national government's river policy is less intrusive than 
the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. The Heritage Rivers System, established in 
1984, allows provinces to enroll rivers voluntarily, rather than through 
action by a national legislature. Despite the lack of coercion at the national 
level, the program is not void of conflict. As Thornburn (1985:115) noted, 
"Canadians are accustomed to hearing complaints about the cost of federal-
ism and the inefficiency caused by duplication in and the differences be-
tween the two levels of government." Nonetheless, cooperation between 
central and provincial governments is a necessity of the Canadian union. 
This large and diverse federal state has often wrestled with questions of 
national identity and provincial autonomy (Pinard 1992; Gaudreault-
DesBiens 1999). Given these dynamics, the Canadian government needs to 
be particularly cautious about actions that might be perceived as imperial-
istic or that might lend political support to provincial independence move-
ments. 
Rather than imposing a river management policy on the regional gov-
ernments, the Canadian Heritage Rivers System approaches river manage-
ment in a spirit of cooperation between the two levels of government. The 
language used in Canadian Heritage Rivers System Objectives, Principles, 
and Procedures (1984) emphasized the joint effort to preserve Canada's 
rivers: 
The System will be a co-operative one in which federal, provincial, 
and territorial governments, in participating in the establishment 
and administration of the System, retain their traditional jurisdic-
tional powers, including ownership of the land, the choice to nomi-
nate a river to the System, and the right to continue to operate and 
manage designated rivers in accordance with the objectives of the 
System. 
By allowing local governments to initiate designation of a heritage river and 
to continue to manage the river in cooperation with the federal government, 
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under program guidelines, the Canadian plan allows for greater local con-
trol and eases jurisdictional conflicts. 
Although Canada's process for designating and managing rivers is 
quite different from the US approach, the Heritage Rivers System and the 
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act share a common purpose in establishing preser-
vationist values for river policy. Although participation is voluntary, the 
Canadian Heritage Rivers System is a highly proactive environmental policy. 
Preservation of river ecosystems is the goal of the Heritage Rivers System 
guidelines. 
A couple of examples illustrate that cooperative management of heri-
tage rivers has been successful. The Grand River in Ontario was designated 
a heritage river in 1994. "Grand Strategy," the watershed management plan 
developed for the Grand River, included community as well as technical 
working groups and required approval from the residents of over 60 com-
munities. In 2000, the Grand River Conservation Authority was awarded the 
Thiess Services Riverprize, an international award for excellence in river 
management (Canadian Heritage Rivers Board 200 I: 18-20). 
The Canadian Heritage Rivers System charter (Parks Canada 1997) 
explicitly recognizes indigenous peoples as stakeholders in the nomination, 
designation, and management of heritage rivers. The Thelon River, desig-
nated a heritage river in 1990, and the Thelon Wildlife Sanctuary, estab-
lished in 1927, are important sites for both the Inuit and Dene peoples. 
Because the Thelon River and Wildlife Sanctuary straddle the border be-
tween the Northwest Territories and the Nunavut Territory, approval from 
both territorial governments as well as their respective communities is 
required in order for a management plan to be adopted. This requirement 
provides considerable influence to the Inuit and Dene in determining how 
the Thelon River will be used and protected. As David Pelly (2001) wrote, 
"Natives and non-Natives alike, having converged from different responsi-
bilities, different histories, different quests, now share the responsibility for 
the care of the northern wilderness. There is a certain irony (a certain 
correctness, even) ... in the fact that it is the Native peoples who now hold 
the balance of power in the management of this wilderness." Cooperation 
between governments that maintain their traditional jurisdictional powers is 
a hallmark of the Canadian Heritage Rivers System. As a result, designation 
and management of heritage rivers cannot be labeled "Ottawa's usurpation 
of provincial authority" by opponents of preservation. 
This is not to say that Canadian river management is devoid of political 
controversy or that preservation inevitably results. For example, in Friends 
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of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (88 D.L.R. [4th] 1 [S.c.c.]), eco-
nomic factors outweighed the concerns of Native communities and environ-
mental groups. The province of Alberta planned to build a dam on the 
Oldman River and had gotten approval under the Navigable Waters Protec-
tion Act. An environmental group sued to compel the federal Departments 
of Transport and Fisheries and Oceans to conduct environmental assess-
ments. Federal versus provincial responsibilities were at issue in the case. 
The court held that the impact of the dam on navigation was a federal matter, 
requiring approval from the minister of transport, but the environmental 
impact of the dam was a provincial matter that did not mandate invol vement 
by the minister of fisheries and oceans. Absence of clear authority in the 
shared management of public works projects "allowed Ottawa to classify 
provincial megaprojects as provincial responsibilities, thereby avoiding 
confrontations with provinces that did not welcome its interest in their 
affairs" (Taylor 1990:29). 
An additional attribute of the Canadian system deserves mention as 
well. Just as it may initiate designation of a heritage river, a province may 
also initiate an action to "de-designate" a river from heritage classification. 
As Noel and Gimble (1993:13) observed, "A Wild and Scenic river, once so 
designated and regardless of its classification, may never be dammed or 
otherwise degraded, and there is no de-designation process. A Canadian 
Heritage river may be 'de-designated' at the nominating province's request, 
or if its values have been significantly degraded." The option of de-designa-
tion may make the Canadian program less appealing to environmentalists 
than the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Under the Heritage Rivers System, 
designated rivers may be subject to continuous efforts to de-designate, in 
order to allow for new development and use. 
Court Cases from the Plains States 
Federal legislative action is seldom the end of the story. Conflicts over 
river policy resolved in the courts provide additional insights into the 
relative merits of state or federal river management plans in achieving 
preservation. 
Oklahoma has had two noteworthy river cases, Flint Ridge Develop-
ment Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association of Oklahoma (426 U.S. 776, 1976) 
and Arkansas v. Oklahoma (503 U.S. 91, 1992). In both cases, Oklahoma's 
decision to provide state protection for a scenic river rather than seeking 
federal designation under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act resulted in a 
judicial determination contrary to the preservation interests of the state. 
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In the Flint Ridge case, a local environmental group challenged a plan 
by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development to construct 
homes along the Illinois River (426 U.S. 782). The group argued that the 
development would interfere with protection of the river consistent with its 
status as a state-designated scenic river. The group sought an injunction 
until the secretary of housing and urban development completed an envi-
ronmental impact study. The secretary claimed that such a study would 
present a conflict of interest between the agency's mandate for development 
and the likelihood that the environmental impact statement would prevent 
development, and the court agreed (426 U.S. 788). The court determined 
that the secretary of housing and urban development cannot risk sacrificing 
development for the sake of environmental concerns. Statutory language, 
combined with the state's failure to have the river designated under the Wild 
and Scenic Rivers Act, prevented Oklahoma from protecting its most pre-
cious river, even though the state itself considered the Illinois River worthy 
of preservation. 
Despite its eligibility, the Illinois River was not designated a wild and 
scenic river by the US Congress, and local news reports indicated that 
federal designation would be unwelcome. The Tulsa World (1994) reported 
that area landowners required reassurance that federal takeover of the wa-
terway was merely a rumor. Although local residents' reluctance to accept 
federal involvement in the management of the Illinois River is understand-
able, the outcome of the Flint Ridge case demonstrated that this reluctance 
has its downside. Oklahoma's river policies alone proved inadequate to 
protect the Illinois River from development. 
Similar conclusions flow from the outcome of the Arkansas v. Okla-
homa case (503 U.S. 91, 1992). Many Illinois River tributaries flow into 
Oklahoma from Arkansas. The water coming from Arkansas carried waste 
exceeding the standards permitted by Oklahoma. Arkansas was unwilling to 
improve water quality to meet those standards, so the dispute moved to 
federal court. The court ruled that Oklahoma could not enact stricter envi-
ronmental safeguards than the Environmental Protection Agency and ex-
pect another state to comply with the more stringent provisions. As long as 
Arkansas had permission from the Environmental Protection Agency to 
dump waste into the Illinois River, state environmental laws would be 
insufficient to prevent that waste from flowing downstream into Oklahoma. 
This ruling probably would not have occurred if the Illinois River had been 
designated as a wild and scenic river. Such a designation would have meant 
a higher standard for water quality in order to prevent degradation of the 
river and its immediate environment. 
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Even when a Plains state is trying to conserve a natural resource and 
protect its citizenry from environmental harm, there is no guarantee that 
state policies will be sufficient to the task in a federal system where state 
conflicts over shared resources are common. It is clear from the court's 
ruling that water usage, regardless of ill effects, is encouraged rather than 
discouraged unless statutory provision for other values is in place. Okla-
homa law cannot provide for preservation in a manner binding on Arkansas; 
only federal law can. 
A case involving a dispute over groundwater provides further evi-
dence that water usage is given priority over water preservation, unless 
statutory provision for preservation is in place. In Sporhase v. Nebraska 
(458 U.S. 941, 1982), a farmer with holdings in both Nebraska and Colo-
rado used water from a Nebraska well to irrigate her land in both states. The 
Nebraska supreme court ruled that use of Nebraska groundwater to irrigate 
Colorado land was violation of Nebraska law (Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 
Neb. 703, 1981). The US Supreme Court reversed the Nebraska ruling, 
concluding that the role of water in agribusiness prohibited restriction on its 
transportation across state boundaries under the commerce clause of the US 
Constitution (Longo 1990). The Nebraska supreme court's ruling, although 
based in part on protectionism, urged conservation of water for future 
generations. By reversing this ruling, the US Supreme Court elevated com-
mercial use over conservation, arguing that the state's conservation inter-
ests were subordinated to commercial use under the commerce clause. 
Given such interpretation, federal statutes that mandate preservation stand 
a better chance 'of success than state efforts. Federal action, however, meets 
with suspicion and hostility from Plains residents. A solution to this quan-
dary is needed. 
The Case of the Niobrara River 
The infamous Sporhase case serves as a reminder that federalism as 
determined by the US Supreme Court often contravenes the wishes of the 
local body politic. As Miewald (1984: 184) noted, "One often gets the 
impression that a government larger than a single farmer and a couple of 
neighbors is a tyranny worse than anything contemplated by King George 
III. And in a state with fewer people than some American cities and counties, 
the capital city is often regarded as the home of some alien power." An 
illustration of this perspective on federalism occurred in the designation of 
Nebraska's Niobrara River as a wild and scenic river. 
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Some Nebraskans wanted to dam the Niobrara River, while others 
sought to enjoin the dam construction. The debate between these two sides 
was predictable, as was its eventual movement to the judicial arena. In Save 
the Niobrara Association v. Andrus (483 F. Supp. 844, 1977), the Court 
ruled that the Bureau of Land Reclamation failed to address questions about 
geologic stability, groundwater quality, and effects of the proposed dam on 
wildlife in its requisite environmental impact statement. As a result, con-
struction of the dam was halted, and debate over the future of the Niobrara 
River shifted to other policy loci. 
The Niobrara River was designated a national wild and scenic river on 
24 May 1991 (P.L. 102-50). An Omaha World-Herald (1989) public opinion 
poll, published just after three members of Nebraska's congressional del-
egation introduced the legislation, indicated that 74% of Nebraskans fa-
vored the designation, 15% opposed it, and II % had no opinion. However, 
the same poll showed that, within the four counties affected by the new 
designation (Rock, Brown, Cherry, and Keya Paha), the opposite view 
prevailed. Fifty-six percent of the residents opposed the designation and 
only 28% favored it. Sixty-eight percent of the ranchers in the four-county 
area opposed the designation and only 18% favored it. Opposition to the 
designation increased in direct proportion to the respondents' physical prox-
imity to the Niobrara River and to the personal impact the designation 
would have on those who envisioned other uses for the river. 
Fear of federal dictates lay at the heart of the opposition. The law that 
incorporated the Niobrara into the Wild and Scenic Rivers System specified 
that a 40-mile segment of the river and cont1uence were to be administered 
by the secretary of the interior (P.L. 102-50, 1991). The law seems to 
transfer control over that section of the river to the federal government from 
the Nebraskans who had controlled it for over a century. This shift in control 
did not sit well with locals, and press coverage continued to reference poll 
results that showed the designation was opposed by a majority of residents 
in the four-county area (Hendee 1991). 
A closer examination of the act shows opportunities for local input 
regarding management of the Niobrara River. Section 5 of the act estab-
lished an advisory commission that "shall advise the Secretary of the Inte-
rior ... on matters pertaining to the development of a management plan" 
(P.L. 102-50), 1991). Membership on the committee was designed to ensure 
that the views of local residents, particularly those with a special interest in 
the management of the Niobrara River, would be represented. It provided 
for six members who own farm or ranch property in the designated river 
corridor, one member who is a canoe outfitter, one member to be chosen by 
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the governor, two members from county governments or natural resource 
districts, and one member from a conservation organization. 
Although the secretary of the interior was given final statutory author-
ity over the designated Niobrara River corridor, active political participa-
tion by the interests represented on the advisory commission could lead to 
river management palatable to local residents. Representatives of ranchers, 
the governor, and local government provide pragmatic access points for the 
disaffected. The process was designed to allow participation by those out-
side the federal bureaucracy. 
It may be tempting for critics of federalism to dismiss local participa-
tion on the advisory commission as illusory and to claim that designation as 
a wild and scenic river has dictated the course of the Niobrara's future. 
Some local residents expressed such sentiments. For example, the Omaha 
World-Herald reported that local rancher Hugh Potter remarked, "I really 
believe, regardless of how many meetings we go to, how many proposals 
that the advisory committee discusses, the public in general will have 
nothing to say in the decision-making" (Thomas 1994). Despite reasonable 
concerns over loss of local control of river management, Nebraskans should 
not conclude that management by the Department of Interior is a guaranteed 
victory for preservationist values. As Shepard (1984:479) noted, "In recent 
years ... the activities of private industries and individuals have threatened 
to prevent many national parks and other specially protected federal re-
serves from fulfilling their declared purposes." Most activity in and around 
the Niobrara will proceed as it has for decades, and some of this activity will 
be almost certainly be disruptive to the purposes of the Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act. 
Legal and political efforts to define the parameters for use of the 
Niobrara River are ongoing. A local environmental group, Friends of the 
Niobrara, is planning to raise money to buy easements along the Niobrara 
because the group believes that the National Park Service has not done 
enough to limit development in the scenic corridor (Laukaitis 2000). Des-
ignation also does not proscribe additional litigation. Sokol v. Kennedy (210 
F. 3d 876, 2000) illustrated that statutory language provides an additional 
access point for disaffected land users. Sokol, a rancher in Cherry County, 
sued the National Park Service over its selection of boundaries for the 
Niobrara scenic river corridor under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Sokol 
disputed the meaning of the phrase "outstandingly remarkable" as it applied 
to land adjacent to the river. He argued that the National Park Service failed 
to give sufficient consideration to the proposal favored by landowners and 
local governments: to establish the boundaries at the high water mark on the 
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riverbank and exclude any land above the bank (210 F. 3d 876). The appeals 
court sided with Sokol, ruling that the Park Service "selected land for 
inclusion in the Niobrara Scenic River area without identifying and seeking 
to protect outstandingly remarkable values, as required by the Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act" (210 F. 3d 878). 
Statutory language provides legal grounds to dispute how much land 
must be protected to preserve the "outstandingly remarkable values" that 
led to a river's designation and to dispute which activities threaten those 
values. Although not as cooperative in design as the Canadian Heritage 
Rivers System, the US Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provides local interests, 
even those opposed to the designation, a voice in river management. As the 
Niobrara River case illustrates, conflicts over how to manage the river to 
achieve statutory goals endure far beyond the designation process. 
Discussion: The Comparative Lessons 
The battle over river protection on the Great Plains has pitted environ-
mentalist against landowner. Landowners have made federalism an under-
lying concern in this dispute, and they have gotten considerable mileage 
from opposing designation on the principles of local control and resistence 
against federal usurpation, rather than framing their opposition in terms of 
self-interest in preserving the status quo. Although federal-state relations are 
obviously important, they also serve a convenient political function of galva-
nizing opposition to wild and scenic river designation for Plains rivers. 
The Canadian Heritage Rivers System provides a means of diffusing 
political opposition to river protection that is grounded in resentment against 
intrusion from a distant capital. Some Plains residents would undoubtedly 
oppose preservationist policy regardless of its source. But tensions between 
state and federal power complicate the debate over appropriate river man-
agement plans and provide political capital to organizations and individuals 
opposed to preservation per se. Because it emphasizes local initiation and 
management, the Canadian alternative avoids the perception of an avari-
cious federal government intent on wrestling control over property and 
natural resources from local residents. Although the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act (P.L. 29-542, 1968: section 13) includes concern for local authority and 
expressly limits federal right to water "to only the quantity necessary to 
accomplish statutory purposes," the perception of federal government ac-
tion as threatening to state sovereignty persists. This perception creates 
incentives for local political officials to resist designation, and it makes 
consensus around shared policy goals more difficult to achieve. 
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The tensions over federal-state jurisdictions in river management are 
greater in the US than in the Canadian approach. Plouffe (1986:848) argued 
that public attitudes toward preservation have changed dramatically. He 
concluded: "Congress should give states with interest and ability to initiate 
river resource planning a meaningful role in federal decisions that deter-
mine the use of rivers within their borders." The heritage river model allows 
local communities to initiate and activate meaningful river policies in part-
nership with provincial and national governments. But the furor over fed-
eral-state relationships in the United States makes similar cooperative efforts 
more difficult. We conclude that the prospects for preservationist water 
policy are improved under the Canadian system. 
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provides an alternative designation 
mechanism with benefits similar to the Canadian Heritage Rivers System. A 
rarely applied provision of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (section 2[a] [ii]) 
allows a river to be designated under the act by request from a state's 
governor. To be designated under section 2(a)(ii), a river must be protected 
under a state's river protection program by an act of the state's legislature. 
The river must also be eligible for federal designation as determined by the 
secretary of the interior. Finally, most costs of administration of the river 
under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act are borne by the state (Hannon and 
Cassidy 1999: 146). 
In a detailed study of section 2(a)(ii), Hannon and Cassidy (1999: 148) 
argued that this provision of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act has been used 
in several cases where there was a "desire within the state to prevent federal 
control of the river." For example, the first river designated under section 
2(a)(ii) was a section of the Allagash Wilderness Waterway in northern 
Maine, which the US Bureau of Outdoor Recreation had recommended 
become a national riverway managed by the US Department of the Interior, 
a move that the state of Maine opposed. Five years later, when the Wild and 
Scenic Rivers Act passed, the governor of Maine requested designation 
under section 2(a)(ii) (Hannon and Cassidy 1999). This option made it 
possible for the state to maintain its control over the river while acquiring 
the increased protection that federal designation provided. 
As we observed in the case of the Niobrara River, a trend toward 
greater local control over river management is underway even where rivers 
were designated through congressional action. The benefits of section 2(a)(ii) 
are that the state government initiates designation and that the state main-
tains a greater degree of responsibility to manage the river under the guide-
lines of the act. These options, if better known, might help to shape the 
public perceptions of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act as a cooperative rather 
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than interventionist water policy. As a result, more rivers may receive 
federal designation, with the attendant benefits of "increased recognition, a 
probable increase in pri vate land values, and increased recreational usage, 
with corresponding economic benefits to the state or states involved" 
(Hannon and Cassidy 1999: 149). According to Hannon and Cassidy (1999), 
by 1998, the 30th anniversary of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, only 16% 
of the total river miles designated under the act had been included in the 
system through section 2(a)(ii). 
Fear of federal intervention has been a consistent obstacle to greater 
use of and public support for national river protection policies like the Wild 
and Scenic Rivers Act. Greater cooperation between federal officials and 
local residents is needed to provide for the future of the great rivers of the 
Great Plains. Both the Canadian Heritage Rivers System and section 2(a)(ii) 
of the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act provide mechanisms for preservationist 
policy grounded on the principle of cooperation. Public support for preser-
vationist values is increasing. This support must not be siphoned off through 
federal action perceived as "dictatorial" or "interventionist," even if those 
perceptions are in error. Preservation-minded policy makers should not 
provide rhetorical ammunition to their adversaries when cooperative means 
of achieving their goals are available. 
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